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U.S. NAVAL OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCING IRAN
Daniel Gouré and Rebecca Grant
This article is intended to explore the range of options the U.S. Navy can pro-vide to policy makers in developing a strategic approach to Iran. The Barack
Obama administration has taken power just as a delicate change is beginning in
the region. The American land, air, and naval presence in the Persian Gulf will
diminish as forces return from Iraq. Simultaneously, the Obama administration
will be trying to elicit from Iran an agreement not to develop a nuclear weapons
program. At the same time, the new administration is committed to restructur-
ing significantly U.S. armed forces. Changes in the naval presence in the region
need to be considered not only with respect to domestic constituencies but also
in light of the nation’s security interests in the region.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the range of policy-relevant options the
U.S. Navy can provide, short of war, that could help shape Iran’s behavior.
“Shaping” as a strategy can be defined as the performance of a set of continuous,
long-term, integrated actions—with a broad spectrum of governmental,
nongovernmental, and international partners—that seeks to influence the be-
havior of target nations and thereby maintain or enhance stability, prevent or
mitigate crises, and enable other operations when crises occur. Actions short of
war designed to influence the behavior of another nation fall under the rubric of
shaping operations. With the end of the Cold War, shaping operations became a
more important part of the Navy’s array of activities.
The Navy’s 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower identified
shaping as one of the critical element of naval operations.
This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea
and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide
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the United States the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military
footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing
of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political re-
percussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces
can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation,
de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts.1
Navy leaders have never been shy about extolling the ability of maritime
forces to shape behavior and influence events. “The Navy’s role in global influ-
ence and deterrence will grow significantly in the future,” Admiral John
Nathman, former Commander, Fleet Forces Command, has said. “You can go up
to 12 nautical miles [to a country’s shoreline] without asking permission. You
come with no footprint. And you deliver a message that can be broad, subtle,
persistent, credible or powerful. The Navy can do that.”2
Demand for Navy shaping operations has risen steadily over the past several
years. All joint forces are engaged in shaping actions, which range from theater
security cooperation and shaping to more elaborate options to deter and seize
the initiative.
When thinking about deterring Iran, one thinks quickly of Navy options. In
fact, there is both a valuable historical legacy and an important niche role for the
Navy in operations to counter Iran at various levels of engagement. The same
warships on scheduled deployment rotation can shift from presence to deter-
rence to the countering of aggression. Day in and day out, Navy forces help set
the limits of Iranian military action in the Gulf.
Few question the idea that unique Navy capabilities to shape and deter have
special strategic significance. Yet there is little awareness in the broader policy
community of the impact that naval presence can have on the situation in the
Persian Gulf over the longer term and during crises. Nor has it been made clear
to decision makers that Iran’s leadership is aware of our naval actions and factors
the presence and operations of the U.S. Navy into its strategic calculations.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN
The United States has struggled to manage the dangers posed by the revolution-
ary regime in Tehran for nearly thirty years. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution,
the central policy objective of the United States has been to change the behavior
of the regime. It has sought to do so by a combination of means, including a
larger military presence in the region, enhanced support for regional allies (in-
cluding, for a time, Iran’s principal adversary, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq), economic
leverage, targeted sanctions, and limited engagement.
The George W. Bush administration was very clear about its security issues
with Iran:
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The behavior of the Iranian regime poses as serious a set of challenges to the interna-
tional community as any problem we face today. Iran’s nuclear ambitions; its sup-
port for terrorism; and its efforts to undermine hopes for stability in Iraq and
Afghanistan, including lethal backing for groups attacking American troops, are all
deeply troubling. So are its destructive actions in Lebanon, its longstanding rejection
of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians, and the profoundly repugnant
rhetoric of its leaders about Israel, the Holocaust, and so much else. Compounding
these concerns is Iran’s deteriorating record on human rights.3
The approach the Bush administration took, like that of its predecessors for the
past thirty years, was largely focused on shaping Iranian behavior.
Our policy toward Iran is clear and focused. First and foremost, we have demon-
strated to the Iranian regime that its provocative and destabilizing policies will entail
painful costs for Iran, including financial hardship, diplomatic isolation, and long-
term detriment to Iran’s prestige and fundamental national interests. Secondly, and
equally importantly, we are working to convince the regime that another, more con-
structive course is available to it.4
Even though only recently in office, the Obama administration has made it
clear that Iran will be a principal focus of its foreign policy. The Obama adminis-
tration appears to hold objectives with respect to Iran very similar to those of the
Bush administration. Foremost on its list of objectives is to prevent Iran from ac-
quiring a nuclear weapon. In a recent television interview President Obama
said, “Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges.” He specifically men-
tioned that country’s support for Lebanese Shia party Hizballah and its nuclear
enrichment program.5
While current U.S. intelligence estimates assert that Iran currently does not
have an active nuclear weapons program, they suggest that this situation could
change rapidly. According to retired admiral Dennis Blair, “We assess Iran has
the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear
weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nu-
clear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing
nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.”6
Current American policy has three basic threads: more negotiations (includ-
ing direct talks), tougher sanctions, and the threat of military action. The goal is
to shape Iranian behavior so as to make a resort to direct military force unneces-
sary. In particular, this means encouraging Iran to enter into direct talks with the
United States and its allies. Ultimately, it is hoped, the diplomatic process will
see Iran moderate its revolutionary stance, forgo the development of nuclear
weapons, and integrate itself into the community of nations. President Obama
is seeking what he terms “a new beginning” with Iran, one that emphasizes di-
plomacy. At the same time, the administration has sought to reinforce the
G O U R É & G R A N T 1 5
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international coalition against Iran’s nuclear program. According to recent press
reports, the new administration has sent a secret letter to the Russian govern-
ment offering to halt development of a ballistic-missile interceptor system in
Eastern Europe, provided that Russia assist in halting Iran’s effort to build nu-
clear warheads and ballistic missiles.7 The president has said that no option,
including the use of force, is off the table with respect to halting the Iranian
nuclear program.
Supporting the policy threads is an important factor in the operation of U.S.
military forces. American military forces can play a large role in shaping Iranian
behavior. Given their inherent
flexibility, sovereign basing, and
tremendous mobility, U.S. naval
forces are particularly well suited
to contributing to shaping activi-
ties. Equally important, the same forces engaged in shaping operations can rap-
idly shift into combat mode, providing high-value military resources to the
theater commander.
Iran’s long-standing foreign-policy goals are to preserve the Islamic regime,
safeguard Iran’s sovereignty, defend its nuclear ambitions, and expand its influ-
ence in the region and the Islamic world. Iranian leaders perceive that regional
developments—including the removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges
facing the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increased influence of
Hamas and Hizballah, and, until recently, higher oil revenues—have given Teh-
ran more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a re-
gional power. This perception has produced a more assertive Iranian foreign
policy, in which Tehran has focused on expanding ties in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Levant to influence and exploit more effectively regional political, economic,
and security developments. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear-weapon capability is an-
other element in its more assertive foreign policy.8
In pursuing its policy objectives vis-à-vis Iran, Washington clearly prefers to
rely on a shaping strategy over the direct use of military force. But such a strategy
presupposes that Iran is amenable to being shaped. There are some who argue
that the Iranian leadership is not susceptible to influence, whether by “carrots”
or “sticks.” This would mean that there is no hope of shaping Iranian behavior in
general or, more specifically, of influencing Iran’s decisions on matters of
security and defense.
There, however, is no evidence to support this contention. According to one
leading American authority,
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
The utility of naval forces comes from their
ability to exert control through presence and to
dominate but contain conflict.
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Although the specifics of Iran’s policies vary considerably, in almost all cases there
has been a shift toward prudence. Particularly near Iran’s own borders, the Islamic
regime has tended to support the status quo with regard to territorial integrity and
has shown a preference for working with governments over substate movements.
Moreover, Iran has tried to contain unrest abroad and has tacitly supported repres-
sion by Turkey and Russia, even when this involved suppressing Muslims. Tehran
has also curtailed ties to most Islamist movements, keeping its network intact but not
pushing for the overthrow of governments.
Iran has also shown prudence in its military posture, including its quest for WMD
[weapons of mass destruction]. Iran’s military budgets have been modest, focused
more on defense than on offense. Despite the geostrategic and other imperatives
driving Iran to acquire WMD, it has done so in a quiet and deliberate manner, avoid-
ing alarm and preventing the United States from developing a strong coalition to
stop its acquisition.9
In fact, Iran has demonstrated a rather nuanced approach to dealing with its
neighbors and with states involved in the region, including the United States.
This suggests that the leadership in Tehran can be influenced and that a process
of shaping its behavior through a mixture of carrots and sticks could be effective
in moderating the regime’s behavior.10
The challenge for the Obama administration will be to find the right kind of
shaping strategy, one that provides signals that Iranian leaders will understand.
As will be discussed below, the U.S. Navy provides a range of options, with vary-
ing degrees of visibility that can contribute to American efforts to shape Iranian
behavior in peacetime or in crisis.
NAVAL OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCING IRAN
The U.S. Navy can be an enormously powerful instrument of policy. There is no
question that in the event of conflict with Iran, the Navy could exert tremendous
pressure through its ability to contest and counter Iranian military moves in the
waters around the Strait of Hormuz. Equally important, it has many potential
opportunities to influence Iran during peacetime and in a crisis. The utility of
naval forces comes from their ability to exert control through Phase 0* presence
and to dominate but contain conflict in Phase II actions. As joint doctrine makes
clear, phases III and beyond require a joint approach. However, as case studies
demonstrate, the Navy has a powerful role in options just short of major conflict.
The ensuing discussion will examine naval options for influencing Iran short of
G O U R É & G R A N T 1 7
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13 February 2008), fig. IV-7.
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those involving a deliberate conflict. Prospective options are grouped by
joint-campaign “phase.” Under each phase, a number of prospective options are
identified.
Shaping the Regional Environment (Phase 0)
Unlike the other services, the Navy has extensive direct experience with the Ira-
nian military and the Revolutionary Guard. American and Iranian warships
pass in close proximity on a regular basis. When operating in the enclosed envi-
ronment of the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to interact with other parties using
the same space, including potential adversaries. This is an important base on
which to develop influence or shaping options. At the same time, all parties in
the region are quite sensitive to changes in that presence. Changes in the number
and types of naval vessels deployed inevitably send messages to friends and foes
alike.
American diplomats view the deployment of naval forces as adding to the ef-
fectiveness of political actions. These forces provide for reassurance of allies, act
as a warning to would-be aggressors, and serve as clear evidence of U.S. interest
in and commitment to the region. One senior diplomat makes the point very
succinctly: “We have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf to reassure
our friends in the Arab world that it remains an area of vital importance to us.”11
Friends and allies of the United States in the Persian Gulf clearly perceive the
presence of its naval forces as deterring potential aggressors. They are not above
using that presence for their own purposes. “Do you think those U.S. warships
are out there on vacation?” Saudi king Abdullah is said to have asked Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during a March 2007 summit meeting.12
The presence of U.S. naval force can shape the regional environment in many
ways. One that is often overlooked is the ability of naval assets to collect intelli-
gence on a wide range of activities. “Maritime domain awareness,” the develop-
ment of a “common operating picture” of the movement of ships and aircraft, is
a critical tool supporting both national and homeland security. Intelligence can
provide warning of emerging dangers, allowing the United States to act to head
them off. The presence of Navy platforms may, in some instances, engender re-
straint on the part of adversaries out of a fear of detection. The U.S. Navy uses a
wide range of assets, including surface vessels, manned and unmanned aerial
platforms, and submarines, to collect intelligence.
Managing the Balance of Forces. The most straightforward way in which the
U.S. Navy can shape the regional environment in the Persian Gulf is by altering
its dispositions in that area. Both the quantity and quality of deployed forces can
be adjusted in response to circumstances. In effect, force deployments can be
treated as a political-military “rheostat” to help establish a more stable
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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environment. A change in naval force levels or the character of deployed forces
can communicate a number of messages simultaneously. The most obvious
change in force posture is associated with the movement of carrier battle groups.
With respect to deployment of two carriers to the Persian Gulf in April 2008,
Lieutenant General Carter Ham, Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said:
It allows us to do a couple of things, by doing that. First, it provides some additional
capability to our commanders in the region for additional air power, which is always
a good thing. It allows us also to demonstrate to our friends and allies in the region a
commitment to security in the region. And importantly, from a military—from a
tactical standpoint, operating two carriers in the same maritime and same airspace si-
multaneously allows us to practice some tactics, techniques and procedures which are
very, very useful to us in a relatively constrained area.13
The U.S. Navy has a range of other assets that it can deploy in the Persian
Gulf to ensure an adequate balance of forces. These include both SSNs and
SSGNs (respectively, nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile–armed sub-
marines). Also, expeditionary strike groups could provide a responsive
land-attack capability, something particularly valuable during the latter stages
of an exit from Iraq.
As U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq and the region, in fact, Washington
may see it as advisable to increase its naval presence in the region in order to
maintain a stable level of military power. Such force deployments can be cali-
brated to provide additional sea-control, land-attack, and amphibious capa-
bilities as needed. The United States has plans to maintain land-based rapid
response forces in Kuwait for the duration of the mission in Iraq and probably
thereafter. Sea-based forces could complement those deployed on land.
It is important that the U.S. government articulate the general strategy and
purpose behind its long-term force deployment plans. Also, the United States
should make explicit the kinds of conditions that would alter these plans. In
the past, the routine reliefs on station of one carrier strike group for another
have been exaggerated in the media as preparations for an attack on Iran.
There is some value in uncertainty. But there is also a value in clarity.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense need to consider what would constitute a stable and robust presence in
the Gulf area, and they should consider making the general character of that
capability known publicly. Changes in naval force deployments could be iden-
tified as contributing to the maintenance of a stable balance of forces in the re-
gion. Moreover, in the event Iran seeks to increase its military capabilities,
additional naval forces could be deployed to counterbalance them and
G O U R É & G R A N T 1 9
7
Gouré and Grant: U.S. Naval Options for Influencing Iran
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
maintain overall stability. At the same time, not all deployments should be
“telegraphed” to Tehran. Altering deployments to the Gulf region on a some-
what unpredictable schedule provides CENTCOM another tool with which to
“communicate” with Iran and potentially deter it by maintaining an element
of tactical and operational uncertainty, while at same time demonstrating stra-
tegic (that is, naval) depth.
The new administration is currently developing its own national security
strategy and related force posture requirements, and associated defense budgets.
It is likely that tightening budgets will force reductions in current force levels. In
making choices of where to reduce forces, it will be important that the adminis-
tration recognize two facts. First, the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf is
one way by which the United States exerts influence over the states in the region;
a robust naval presence in the region is required if the Navy is to perform the
multitude of missions it has been assigned. In addition, the character of the na-
val forces deployed is important in American efforts to signal Iran that Tehran
does not have a free hand in the region and that its options for using force to
achieve its regional objectives are quite limited: “The Middle East isn’t a region
to be dominated by Iran. The [Persian] Gulf isn’t a body of water to be con-
trolled by Iran. That’s why we’ve seen the United States station two carrier battle
groups in the region.”14
Second, because of the distances involved, for every ship deployed in the Per-
sian Gulf, the Navy needs at least three more in the fleet to allow for rotation,
steaming time, and maintenance. Even seemingly small reductions in the size of
the fleet can have enormous consequences for the U.S. Navy’s presence in the
Persian Gulf.
Confidence-Building Measures. Since the late 1970s, the Persian Gulf has been
an arena of extraordinary tensions. Since that time the U.S. Navy has been en-
gaged in two declared conflicts—DESERT SHIELD/STORM and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM—several individual military engagements, and a host of other mili-
tary operations. In addition, the region has seen internal conflicts, such as the
1980–88 Iran-Iraq War. American naval forces and those of some two dozen na-
vies have continually navigated the congested waters of the Gulf. It is no surprise
that incidents involving military forces, such as the Exocet missile strike on the
USS Stark (FFG 31) in May 1987 and the January 2008 confrontation between
Iranian patrols boats and U.S. Navy warships, continue to occur.
It is all too easy to think that the only U.S. naval options for influencing Iran
are those intended to counter the latter’s negative behavior. Far more intriguing
is the possibility of employing the American naval presence in the region in ways
that might encourage positive behavior. Given the parlous state of the current
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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relationship between Washington and Tehran, efforts to develop a more positive
relationship should start with small, concrete steps that benefit both sides and
demonstrate the potential for cooperative endeavors.
Iran and the United States have been in a state of nearly unrelieved confronta-
tion for almost thirty years. Since the Iranian revolution, the United States and
the Islamic Republic of Iran have
had virtually no direct communi-
cations. Even their indirect en-
gagements have been limited.
This lack of communications is
dangerous for all parties. The U.S.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admi-
ral Gary Roughead, observes, “I do not have a direct link with my counterpart in
the Iranian Navy. I don’t have a way to communicate directly with the Iranian
Navy or Guard.”15 Even more challenging is the gulf that exists between the U.S.
Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which also maintains
a significant naval force. Recent incidents involving U.S. naval vessels in the Per-
sian Gulf have involved IRGC units, not forces of the Iranian navy.
The reality is, however, that Iran and the United States do talk to one another
constantly. They do so in the context of the day-to-day operations in the Persian
Gulf that both refuse to talk about. These are not formal communications but
rather the tactical exchanges necessitated by the operation of ships in close prox-
imity; in the cramped waters of the Persian Gulf, American and Iranian military
forces communicate daily. As one senior U.S. naval officer has pointed out, “We
are operating very close to their territorial waters in a very confined space with a
tremendous amount of traffic, be it the small dhows, be it the supertankers go-
ing up to the oil platforms. . . . The margin of error is smaller in that the space is
more confined. That would be the case even if anyone was your ally, just because
of the sheer small size of the Arabian Gulf.”16
One approach that can be employed to shape the region’s political environ-
ment and, at the same time, address specific issues is the development of
confidence-building measures (CBMs). These measures are intended to reduce
fear and suspicion and to make the behavior of states more predictable. Typi-
cally, CBMs involve the exchange of information, particularly regarding the sta-
tus and activities of armed forces, and the creation of agreed mechanisms to
verify this information.
A recent study by a reputable nonprofit institution identified naval CBMs as
one avenue for establishing at some level official communications between Iran
and the United States and at the same time addressing immediate, practical se-
curity issues. The study proposed an effort to articulate CBMs related to major
G O U R É & G R A N T 2 1
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security issues. Related to this proposal was another that CBMs start with practi-
cal and operational challenges in areas of common interest, such as incidents at
sea, drug trafficking, and border control.17 Success in these areas would result in
a number of benefits for U.S. security and that of the region. Agreed-upon “rules
of the road” and communications channels for dealing with incidents at sea or
interdiction of drug trafficking would benefit U.S. naval operations in the
Persian Gulf.
The United States could also seek to cooperate with Iran on a limited basis in
carefully selected areas. It would be unwise to push immediately for an “inci-
dents at sea” agreement between the United States and Iran. Instead, the United
States should explore the possibility of a series of more limited measures to build
up a history of cooperative activities with Iran. One of these might be
counternarcotics and countersmuggling. Such cooperation could begin most
simply with the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard offering to keep the Iranian navy ap-
prised of American patrol activities. This could then be expanded to exchanges
of information on illicit activities and possibly by a U.S. offer to provide Iran
with data from tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plat-
forms. This type of cooperation was successfully undertaken by Great Britain in
the 1990s.18
The United States could pursue discussions with Iran on CBMs not directly
but through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although the GCC states
and Iran have often been in opposition, they share a common interest in safe
passage through the Gulf. In addition, by leading any discussions with Iran the
GCC would provide something of a buffer to the low-level U.S.-Iranian dialogue
that would naturally occur. The focus should be on engaging the Iranian navy
and not the IRGC. Discussions should be very low-key and designed to address
issues of mutual interest.
Operate with Allies. As discussed above, the new American naval strategy places
great emphasis on cooperation with allies and the development of indigenous
naval capabilities. This is an area that has seen tremendous progress since 2001,
driven by the demands of the war on terror. The U.S. Navy has conducted nu-
merous exercises involving global allies as well as nations in the Middle East.
Many of these exercises are focused on operations other than war, such as
humanitarian assistance and civil support.
Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence,
creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile de-
fense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-
deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture
planned for defense of the United States. Our advantage in space—upon which much
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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of our ability to operate in a networked, dispersed fashion depends—must be pro-
tected and extended. We will use forward based and forward deployed forces,
space-based assets, sea-based strategic deterrence and other initiatives to deter those
who wish us harm.19
Numerous examples of what the Navy has been doing to improve coopera-
tion with U.S. allies could be mentioned. In November 2007 it began a series of
exercises in the Gulf and nearby waters with a five-day crisis-response exercise
involving an aircraft carrier, two assault ships, and other amphibious ships, as
well as air and medical forces. The start of the exercises coincided with an agree-
ment of world powers in London to move ahead with a third round of sanctions
against Iran. Tehran tried to address their concerns about its nuclear program.
The purposes of the exercises were described by a Navy spokesman: “Our pri-
mary goal is to enforce maritime security including the free flow of commerce
through the Gulf for all regional partners. . . . We are committed to keeping the
Strait of Hormuz open to ensure that there is a free flow of commerce through-
out the region.”20
Cooperative activities and exercises can also be conducted to address sce-
narios other than potential conflicts. In 2007 the U.S. Navy participated in a
disaster-response exercise in the region. The first phase was a tabletop dis-
cussion that focused on planning, after which operational assets moved into
action and USS Wasp (LHD 1) transported relief supplies and equipment
ashore to a staging base in Bahrain. The exercise scenario involved a tropical cy-
clone striking a notional regional nation, destroying its critical infrastructure,
shutting down its international airport and desalination and electrical plants,
and displacing thousands of citizens. The scenario also included an oil spill from
a damaged tanker at sea. According to Rear Admiral Terence E. McKnight, Com-
bined Task Force (CTF) 59 commander, “One cannot predict when or where a
natural disaster is going to take place. But we can train to improve our response
when a host nation requests our assistance. Coalition forces are committed to
helping a host nation that requests our assistance by providing support, security
and stability to the region.”21
The Navy is aggressively conducting maritime security operations in the re-
gion, evolutions intended to combat sea-based and other illegal activities, such
as hijacking, piracy, and human trafficking. The CENTCOM Coalition Mari-
time Forces Component and its subordinate combined task forces (150, 152, and
158) are designed to conduct multinational coalition security activities. Creat-
ing combined maritime forces is important in signaling to adversaries the
United States is not acting alone. CTF 150, established near the beginning of
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, with logistics facilities at Djibouti, is tasked to
monitor, inspect, board, and stop suspect shipping off the Horn of Africa.
G O U R É & G R A N T 2 3
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Countries recently contributing to CTF 150 include Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, aside from the United States;
other nations that have participated are Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. The command of the task force rotates
among the participating navies, usually between four to six months at a time.
The task force usually comprises fourteen or fifteen vessels.
CTF 152, established in March 2004, is responsible for conducting maritime
security operations in the central and southern Persian Gulf. CTF 158 is an in-
ternational naval task group set up to operate in Iraqi waters. It consists of assets
from the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, the Royal Australian Navy, and the
Singaporean navy working alongside elements of the Iraqi navy and the Iraqi
marines.
Cooperation involves far more than simply hosting American forces. A wide
range of advisory, training, and exercise activity takes place with southern Gulf
states, as well as British and sometimes French forces, at the multilateral level.22
Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) conducts maritime security
conferences and symposiums in its area of responsibility, such as the Maritime
Infrastructure Protection Symposium, in Bahrain 26–28 February 2008.
NAVCENT’s deployed forces are operationally assigned to the Fifth Fleet, units
of which conduct mine-hunting and sweeping exercises and live operations,
mine-countermeasures surveys, and explosive ordnance disposal. These activ-
ities help ensure the sea lines of communication remain open, guaranteeing
the free flow of commerce into and out of the region.
A lack of interoperability, specialization, and orientation around key mis-
sions leaves most southern Gulf navies with only limited ability to cooperate in
these activities. So does a lack of effective airborne surveillance and of modern
mine and antisubmarine warfare capabilities.23 Saudi Arabia is planning a major
modernization program for its Eastern, or Persian Gulf, Fleet that would include
surface combatants, helicopters, seagoing tugs, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The Littoral Combat Ship would be an excellent candidate for this program, and
its sale would help achieve interoperability. To achieve interoperability, an in-
crease in the number of training exercises with regional navies, either at the bi-
lateral or multilateral level, is needed. Also required will be standard operating
procedures, doctrine, and a common data link for shared and improved situa-
tional awareness.24
Maritime Domain Awareness. While the U.S. Navy has many options for Phase
0, some gaps have been identified. An important policy recommendation would
be to consider improvements that would enhance shaping operations. One of
these is to boost surveillance capabilities and improve allied participation to
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establish and maintain maritime domain awareness. Such tasks as maintaining
tracks on nonemitting vessels that do not respond to hails can make a major dif-
ference in the maritime environment. Data for the maritime picture can be fed
by many types of surveillance sensors and platforms. What is needed is a careful
fusion of information into a common picture, followed by dissemination to
those who need it.
One of the most powerful tools available to the United States in shaping re-
gional security environments and empowering local allies is its ability to provide
“enablers” that enhance the operational effectiveness of friendly forces. Exam-
ples include sensors and surveillance systems, communications capabilities, en-
gineering and logistics functions, simulators, and mission planning. Among the
most important enablers are the ISR systems that contribute to maritime
domain awareness.
Deterring Hostile Actions (Phase I)
A central focus of U.S. military deployments in the Persian Gulf is to deter Iran
from taking actions deemed inimical to American interests. The presence of U.S.
naval forces in the Gulf, and since 1991 in Kuwait, is a visible demonstration of
the interest of the United States in the region and of commitment to secure its
national interests and defend allies.
Iran’s actions of principal concern to the United States include its nuclear
program, support for extremist groups in the region, assistance to anti-U.S.
forces in Iraq, and efforts to undermine U.S. allies. In addition, Iran’s efforts to
develop asymmetric capabilities designed to hold U.S. forces and allies in the re-
gion at risk or to contest movement in the Gulf must also be considered as po-
tentially destabilizing. American planners must consider the possibility that
Iran may threaten to resort to military force should the pressures on Tehran to
change its behaviors become intolerable.
Deterrence must include a clear message to Iran that it cannot alter the strate-
gic situation in the region through the use of force, however much it may try. In
recent years, Iran has engaged in a series of information operations intended to
create the impression that it is capable of exerting its military power in the Per-
sian Gulf. Iranian sources claim that the Islamic Republic’s navy can close the
Gulf. To accomplish this, Iran is relying on a strategy of asymmetric warfare—in
essence, guerrilla warfare at sea.25
The United States, together with its allies, needs to conduct its own informa-
tion campaign. This campaign should be accompanied by clear demonstra-
tions—through exercises, fleet deployments, and cooperative activities with
allies—that the United States can rapidly defeat Iran’s asymmetric warfare
strategy.
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The heart of deterrence and dissuasion is the promise of unacceptable
consequences. The recipient of the deterrent/dissuasion message must con-
sider either his fate too painful or his gain too small to justify his current be-
havior. In other words, he must be confronted by the likelihood that the
opponent will impose unacceptable costs or negate the effects of his actions.
Deterrence theory suggests a number of potential options: preemption/first
strike, retaliation, and defenses, either alone or in combination. It may be
possible to threaten preemption or retaliation with conventional forces even
against a nuclear-armed adversary, although the persuasiveness of a
nonnuclear response to a nuclear threat is uncertain.
It is important that a deterrence/dissuasion strategy be, to the greatest extent
possible, collective in nature, involving U.S. allies in the region. Obviously, the
support of allies would be important to the implementation of most deterrent
threats. Equally important, there should be no doubt in the minds of Iran’s lead-
ers that the United States and its allies are in agreement regarding responses to
Iranian actions. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for greater co-
operation among the Gulf nations in the areas of air and missile defense and the
monitoring of local waters as a means of deterring Iran.26 The fact that the
United States and its allies, particularly the GCC states, are undertaking serious
contingency planning should be part of the deterrent message to Iran.
Offensive Deterrent Options. What kinds of offensive military options might
the United States need either to supplement its economic, diplomatic, and other
tools to dissuade Iran from resorting to military force? Options for the use of
force must be credible and appropriate to the nature of the activities to be de-
terred. At the same time, the United States must indicate that it can escalate be-
yond the ability of the Iranian military to respond. Speaking to the idea of using
the threat of disproportionate military action to dissuade hostile Iranian ac-
tions, defense analyst Anthony Cordesman suggests that
this could mean at least demonstrating U.S. capability to carry out far more punitive
strikes. Iran is vulnerable in other areas. The U.S. has no interest in the survival of its
gas facilities, power grid, or refineries. It may have underground nuclear facilities,
but its reactor facility is vulnerable and so are its military production facilities. Asym-
metric warfare is not simply the province of the weak; it is also the province of the
strong.27
Deterrent options often require visibility or public disclosure that are not al-
ways consonant with the secrecy and surprise that operational consideration
would ordinarily warrant. It is reported that most U.S. Navy ships transit the
Strait of Hormuz at night, so as not to attract attention, and rarely in large num-
bers. On at least one occasion, however, a daylight transit was conducted.
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Depending on specific circumstances, one relatively straightforward option
available to the Navy would be to make certain transits during the day or in
relatively large numbers.
Without question, naval forces would play a prominent part in any strike op-
tion against Iran. As noted above, the United States has periodically deployed
carrier battle groups to the Gulf as a reminder of its offensive and defensive ca-
pabilities. The Navy has the option under its Fleet Response Plan to surge carrier
forces to the Gulf. This would be a highly visible and potentially provocative ac-
tion, one that should only be taken when there is a requirement to send the
strongest signal to Tehran.
A possible alternative deterrent option could be to deploy one or more of the
Navy’s four cruise missile–armed submarines to the Gulf region. Unlike the car-
rier option, this would not be a visible deterrent, but it could be accompanied
with an information campaign making clear that the United States was deploy-
ing assets of this type to the region.
Defensive Deterrent Options. Iran has repeatedly sought to pursue its own de-
terrence strategy. This has centered on the threat to contest transit of the Persian
Gulf or otherwise interfere with the flow of oil. The Iranian Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, has warned, “If the Americans make a wrong move toward
Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans
would not be able to protect energy supply in the region.”28
Iran has deployed a broad range of capabilities to threaten both civilian and
military shipping in the Gulf. This includes a large number of small surface ves-
sels, submarines, sea mines, shore-based antishipping cruise missiles, and
manned aircraft.29 This capability is intended to support an antiaccess strategy.
The former commander of CENTCOM, Admiral William Fallon, has described
Iran’s increasing military capabilities as focused on blocking U.S. military oper-
ations: “Based on my read of their military hardware acquisitions and develop-
ment of tactics . . . they are posturing themselves with the capability to attempt
to deny us the ability to operate in this vicinity.”30
The U.S. Navy could counter Iranian threats to itself or commercial shipping
in the Gulf, thereby potentially deterring not only such attacks but undercutting
a main pillar of Iran’s effort to create its own asymmetric threat. The principal
deterrent the Navy can provide is the capability to surge large and capable forces
into the Gulf region. Such a force must be able to conduct a wide range of mis-
sions, strike a broad range of sea- and land-based targets, conduct antimine and
antisubmarine operations, and engage in comprehensive ISR.
As the Navy surges into the Gulf, it would have to deal with a number of Ira-
nian antiaccess threats. But in order to cope with some threats, such as sea mines
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and small boats, it would be necessary to establish air dominance. The combina-
tion of F/A-18E/Fs, F-18 Growler electronic-warfare aircraft, and, when they are
deployed, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters will give the Navy a powerful contribution
to what will be a joint fight.
Successful air dominance will include area air and missile defense. The de-
fense against cruise missiles is a challenge the Navy is preparing to address. Its
Naval Integrated Fire Control–Counter Air (NIFC-CA) program is a “system of
systems” that will link sensors, aircraft, ships, and even land-based air-defense
missiles to neutralize large numbers of targets at long ranges and all altitudes.
This improvement is essential, because missile defense has become a multilay-
ered problem. Threats come from short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
and combinations of them. Cruise missiles can be launched from land or sea,
further complicating the problem. The Navy needs to improve its capabilities
continuously if it is to maintain unfettered access near Iran.
For example, central to NIFC-CA is the new E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. The
E-2D will not only expand the Navy’s surveillance capability but also, for the
first time, enable naval and joint forces to conduct effective defenses against
cruise missiles. The E-2D will be able to draw threat data from its own sensors
and other ISR systems, establish engagement priorities, and match available
weapons to targets. Demonstrating this capability in the Gulf could be a signifi-
cant deterrent to Iranian aggression.
Iran has an inventory of 195 patrol boats and small surface combatants. Most
of these are armed with, at best, machine guns and small-caliber cannons. Iran
also has three frigates, ten fast attack craft, and another dozen patrol boats
armed with antiship cruise missiles. In a 6 January 2008 incident, five Iranian
high-speed boats reportedly charged U.S. warships and perhaps even threatened
to blow them up. In mid-December 2007, an American warship fired a warning
shot at a small Iranian boat that came too close, causing the Iranians to pull
back.
One experienced naval officer referred to incidents like these as evincing an
Iranian desire to “scrape paint” with a U.S. warship. They convey the deter-
mined, committed face of Iran’s navy. Professional as Iranian naval personnel
are on most occasions, the clear impression conveyed is that Iranian crews can
be very determined and ready to seize opportunities to “shape back,” with pos-
turing activities directed at the United States and other nations.
Navy surface combatants and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft all can be de-
ployed against the Iranian surface threat generally. The United States has a range
of options for dealing with the small-boat threat specifically. In the near future,
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), equipped with the antiship module, will be an
extremely effective means of countering limited Iranian small-boat operations.
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One deterrent option that falls in the U.S. Navy’s domain of expertise is an-
tisubmarine warfare (ASW). Iran has three Russian-built Kilo-class diesel-
electric submarines, armed with advanced torpedoes and mines. More than
half of Iran’s inventory of modern mines is deployable only by the Kilos. The
U.S. Navy is seeking to rehone skills in ASW lost after the end of the Cold War;
it will need them if it is to find and neutralize rapidly Iran’s submarines. Here
the LCS, employing ASW modules, will be extremely effective. So too would be
the Virginia-class SSN, with its improved sonar, mast-mounted sensors, and
weapons systems.
Iran also is seeking to develop a credible missile threat against its neighbors
and to American military bases in the region.31 The deployment of effective mis-
sile defenses could dissuade Iran
from pursuing this option or, at
the very least, reduce its effective-
ness. The United States maintains
at least one Patriot Advanced Ca-
pability 3 (PAC-3) battery in Kuwait and is assisting Israel (which Iran has long
threatened to target) in the development and operation of its long-range missile
defenses.
The U.S. Navy is planning to deploy the Aegis ballistic missile–defense
(BMD) system on dozens of surface combatants. This capability could add im-
measurably to U.S. capabilities to defeat the threat and hence to dissuade Iran
from pursuing a very expensive military program. This effort could begin with a
series of exercises and demonstrations in the Gulf. In June 2008 the U.S. Navy
conducted a coordinated naval missile-defense exercise in the eastern Mediter-
ranean and northern Persian Gulf. This exercise demonstrated the ability to
share data and track ballistic missiles along multiple flight trajectories.32
Missile defenses can also serve to reassure allies, such as Israel, making it po-
tentially less likely that they would react to a perceived threat from Iran with of-
fensive action. But for this assurance to be credible, the United States would have
to station several Aegis-capable ships permanently in the Persian Gulf and pos-
sibly also in the Black Sea. In addition, the Navy would need to increase the
number of Aegis warships equipped with the new antimissile-capable Standard
Missile 2. It has today too few Aegis BMD-capable ships, armed with too few
missiles.
The U.S. Navy can provide deterrence options in addition to sea-based forces.
Navy aerial assets can be deployed from land bases in the region in a display of
American engagement, cooperation with allies, and ability to oppose Iranian
threats. The Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye air-surveillance/command-and-control and
EP-3 intelligence-collection aircraft provide critical support not only to naval
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operations but to CENTCOM’s overall plans and activities. Deploying these air-
craft as early as possible to the Gulf region could demonstrate to Iran the futility
of its strategy of deploying antishipping cruise missiles.
The United States can also contribute to its deterrence objectives by improv-
ing the capabilities of its allies. Washington needs to press the GCC countries to
increase their ability to operate as a combined force both among themselves and
with U.S. forces. Given their small populations, their militaries need to focus on
quality—in other words, technology—over quantity. These nations should be
convinced to invest in air and missile defense capabilities, ISR, mine warfare,
and even ASW. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a modernization program for its East-
ern Fleet that could see acquisition of ten to twelve Littoral Combat Ships plus
helicopters, support ships, and naval tugs. In addition, passive defenses, includ-
ing hardening of critical facilities, communications, command and control in-
frastructure, and airfields, should be encouraged.33
Seize the Initiative/Containing Aggression (Phase II)
The overriding focus of Phase II operations is ensuring the free flow of traffic in
the Persian Gulf. This responsibility was made clear by Admiral Kevin Cosgriff,
former commander of the Fifth Fleet, when in response to reporters’ questions
regarding the possibility that Iran might seek to close the Strait of Hormuz he
declared that this would be equivalent to “saying to the world that 40 percent of
oil is now held hostage by a single country.” Cosgriff went on to declare, “We will
not allow Iran to close it.”34
The primary focus of naval options in Phase II must be preventing Iran from
controlling access to the Persian Gulf and from interfering with the flow of oil. A
secondary focus is to deny Iran the ability to escalate conflict. In order to achieve
both of these objectives, the U.S. Navy must be able to seize the initiative rapidly.
Although a shift from Phase I to Phase II operations would mean that deter-
rence has failed, it is unlikely to have failed completely. As has been seen in the
past, Iranian aggression may be limited. The IRGC may conduct hostile acts but
not the Iranian military. Aggression may take the form of deployment of sea
mines but not of direct attacks on commercial or military vessels. Iran may take
action at sea but not threaten U.S. bases or allies in the region. By ensuring that it
is able to respond at the level of aggression demonstrated by Iran, the U.S. Navy
can help to limit its scope without offering a provocation that could lead to
escalation.
Crisis Communications. One of the important considerations as a crisis evolves
into a confrontation or even outright hostilities is the need to avoid conflict by
mistake or miscommunications. This would be particularly important in the
crowded and often confusing environment of the Persian Gulf. Good crisis
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communication is also important in complex humanitarian situations, where
the movement of U.S. naval forces might be misinterpreted. For that reason, the
U.S. Navy has practiced crisis communications as part of its exercise program in
the region, as well as globally.35
An outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf would take place in the context
of transformed international news media, which would affect how the entire
world responded to the situation. Iran would undertake its own information
campaign to influence the behavior of regional parties and world public opin-
ion. As suggested above, it is important for the U.S. Navy to pursue in peacetime
options to develop better communications with elements of the Iranian mili-
tary. Such options might bear remarkable fruit when it comes to the opening of
hostilities.
Crisis communications must be part of the Navy’s information operations
plan. The most likely scenarios involving an outbreak of hostilities should be
identified and war-gamed. The Navy can provide CENTCOM and the national
command authorities (i.e., the president and secretary of defense) with commu-
nications options to support theater operations and global outreach. It is likely
that the U.S. Navy and Fifth Fleet have developed options for use in an escalating
crisis.
Mine Clearance. One characteristic of past confrontations with Iran has been
that nation’s indirect use of military means. During the so-called Tanker War
of the 1980s, the Iranians engaged in limited operations in the Gulf, using
mines deployed from civilian vessels. Iran could again seek to deploy mines
surreptitiously.
The ability to neutralize rapidly the Iranian air and naval threats in the
Persian Gulf would also be critical to efforts by American naval forces to
counter the Iranian sea-mining capability. The Navy has been conducting
mine warfare exercises in the Gulf primarily using aging Avenger-class
mine-countermeasures ships. The Navy is moving to modular counter-mine
systems embedded on destroyers, submarines, helicopters, and the new Lit-
toral Combat Ship. Additional exercises using more modern systems would
be a valuable demonstration of U.S. capability.
Rapid deployment of minesweeping systems would provide an option for
countering a major Iranian threat. The Navy needs to make it easier to surge
minesweeping capabilities—both the existing vessels and newer, more capa-
ble remote de-mining systems—to the Gulf. The U.S. Navy also should en-
courage the GCC to acquire advanced minesweeping capabilities.
Antisubmarine Warfare. Over the longer term, one of the more potent threats
available to Iran, as noted, is its fleet of Russian-built Kilo-class attack
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submarines, armed with antiship cruise missiles and mines. The U.S. Navy
would have to move extremely rapidly to neutralize this threat, particularly be-
fore the Kilos could lay mines to impede the Persian Gulf shipping channels.36
One possible option would be to destroy the Kilos before they could be de-
ployed. Such a preemptive action could be made conditional on intelligence that
they were preparing to deploy. Precision strikes against Iran’s submarine plat-
forms could be carried out by Navy strike aircraft and cruise missile–armed
ships and submarines.
It would also possible, albeit more difficult, to find, track, and engage the Ki-
los under way. To be successful, the U.S. Navy would have to deploy a significant
number of airborne, surface, and subsurface ASW platforms and defend these
against Iranian air defense and antiship capabilities.
Missile Defense. The Iranian use of ballistic or cruise missiles could be central to
the move from Phase I to Phase II. The ability to deploy theater missile defenses
rapidly to protect American facilities and forces and allied territory could help
control the level of violence and deny Iran the initiative.
Sea-based missile defenses are currently the most widely available, deploy-
able, and flexible capability available to a theater commander. Aegis BMD-
capable ships could be deployed to provide effective missile defenses of the
Gulf region. One or more ships could be routinely deployed in anticipation
of an escalating crisis, providing defense against Iranian preemption. If ships
needed to be deployed to the Gulf after hostilities had started, they would be
made part of a task force, for protection against other Iranian threats. Of
course, any ships deployed would have to be on constant guard for such
threats as antiship cruise missiles. A robust, credible ability to deal with the
most sophisticated antiship cruise missiles on the market is vital for main-
taining shaping options.
For the longer term, the Navy could have additional missile defense capabili-
ties such as a replacement for the cancelled Kinetic Energy Interceptor or a
marinized version of the Theater High-Altitude Air Defense System. Such a sys-
tem could be deployed in the Black Sea or eastern Mediterranean to defend Eu-
rope and the United States against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
Blockade. What might be done short of war were Iran to move aggressively to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability? One of the most powerful (yet poten-
tially dangerous) options is a blockade. In 2008, resolutions were introduced
in both houses of Congress calling for increased pressure on the government of
Iran by, among other means, prohibiting the import of refined petroleum
products.37 Such a blockade would be an obvious possibility should Iran at-
tempt to interfere with the flow of oil or seek to close the Persian Gulf entirely.
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But it would also be a potential “weapon of last resort,” for use if nonmilitary ef-
forts to halt Iran’s nuclear program failed.
Once Iran actually built nuclear weapons, a blockade would be a riskier op-
tion. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, a blockade might
still be a useful option should Iran seek to use its nascent nuclear capability as a
shield behind which to attack its neighbors or interfere with the free flow of
commerce in the Gulf. The recent United Nations resolution allowing mem-
bers states to halt and even board North Korean ships suspected of carrying
contraband materials is an example of a “blockadelike” action taken against a
state that has demonstrated some nuclear-weapons capabilities.
Operationally, such an effort would be well within the capacity of the U.S.
Navy. It would involve continuing global surveillance to identify cargoes and
ships bound for Iran. Halting and inspecting ships is something at which the
Navy is very good.
HOLDING FAST TO MARITIME OPTIONS
It is clear that the U.S. Navy has already made and continues to make a signifi-
cant contribution to shaping the strategic behavior of Iran. The Navy can pro-
vide options for the theater commander and the national authorities across the
spectrum of conflict. What is particularly important is the number and variety
of options available to support early shaping activities.
In Phase 0 the Navy can take a leading role in providing means for opening
communications with elements of the Iranian military. The development of
confidence-building measures would both reduce risks inherent in conduct-
ing day-to-day operations in the Gulf and provide an opening for improved
communications. The Navy can also have a major positive impact on the secu-
rity of allies in the region through cooperative exercises, educational activities,
and the extension of maritime domain awareness. Enhanced cooperation with
allies would appear to be the most important option in both Phase 0 and Phase
I. In these phases naval forces would be expected to operate in conjunction
with other elements of U.S. power, such as the State Department. In the event
of conflict with Iran, the Navy—though it would operate with joint and com-
bined forces—would have perhaps the most important strategic role of all U.S.
forces. It will be required to ensure that the Gulf remains open to friendly mili-
tary and commercial traffic and that the movement of oil is not interdicted.
The Navy needs to focus on ensuring that it can deal with the most stressing
threats to movement in and through the Gulf, specifically sea mines, Iranian
submarines and missile-armed patrol craft, and nuisance (even suicide) at-
tacks by small, high-speed boats. An additional important role for the Navy is
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the provision of effective missile defense; the ability to neutralize that threat
will contribute significantly to deterrence of Iranian aggression.
If the adversarial situation between the United States and Iran persists, the
United States will have to address the potential improvements that Iran is likely
to make in its military capabilities. Among these would be “triple-digit” surface-
to-air missiles, advanced sea-skimming cruise missiles with passive radar seek-
ers, and more capable ballistic missiles. The counter to these threats would be
more and better air and missile defenses.
Cynics often point out that military power is a blunt instrument. In the case
of Navy shaping operations short of war, recent experience shows the set of tools
to be in fact remarkably fine and well adapted to their tasks. Keeping the Strait of
Hormuz open, providing an operational architecture for allies, and hemming in
Iranian military options constitute major roles for today’s U.S. Navy. Given the
high-stakes diplomacy under way now, holding fast to maritime options is
indispensable.
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